Attributional biases, or, cognitive tendencies in evaluating behaviour, often deviate from rationality, leading to perceptual distortions or inaccurate interpretations. Despite these deviations, this essay will discuss the extent to which attributional biases can be considered ‘adaptive’, or, their ability to precipitate positive psychological, emotional and behavioural outcomes. This essay will explore the adaptivity of two attributional biases: the self-serving bias and the fundamental attribution error (FAE). The former refers to the cognitive tendency in which individuals attribute positive outcomes to their own abilities and efforts, while attributing negative outcomes to external factors or situational influences (Ross & Miller, 1975). The latter refers to the tendency to overestimate the role of dispositional factors and underestimate the role of situational factors in determining others’ behaviour (Jones & Harris, 1967). Careful consideration will also be given to the contextual idiosyncrasies that influence any determination of adaptivity.

The adaptivity of the self-serving bias lies in its contribution to the enhancement of self-esteem and to the protection from potential harm to self-esteem. In this sense, it is useful to consider the self-serving bias as a conglomeration of two sister biases, the self-enhancing bias, the motivation to preserve or amplify positive self-views, and the self-protection bias, the motivation to lessen negative one’s self views (Sedikides, 2012).

Regarding the self-enhancing bias, if self-esteem is defined as how we value and perceive ourselves, attributing positive outcomes to our own efforts and attributes will naturally amplify our self-evaluation and self-perception. Research has shown that high self-esteem individuals exhibit the self-enhancing bias more in the promotion and restoration of self-worth (Brown et al., 2003) and the maintenance of positive self-views (Blaine & Crocker, 1993). High self-esteem has been found to confer numerous benefits to the individual, such as improved general psychological health (Trzesniewski et al., 2006), social acceptance (Leary, Cottrell & Phillips, 2001), and existential safety (Leary, 2004). This relationship is further visible in comparative studies between those with lower self-esteem and those with higher self-esteem, in which the latter were more likely to devalue sources of negative feedback and praise sources of positive feedback (Baumgardner et al., 1989). The adaptivity of the self-enhancing bias is most clear in studies that have shown that greater self-enhancement linearly predicts psychological health. In an empirical investigation that employed a measure of the self-enhancing bias alongside multiple measures of mental health, the relationship was found to be linear and positive (Sedikides et al., 2004). This relationship can be largely attributed to this bias’s positive contribution to self-esteem.

However, excessively attributing positive outcomes to your own attributes and efforts while failing to recognise how personal flaws may have contributed to negative outcomes can result in overly grandiose and arrogant self-presentations. These traits, commonly associated with narcissism and egocentrism, have been shown to invite dislike and derision (Robins & Beer, 2001). Given the observed social norm of modesty in the West, excessive self-serving bias is likely to cause negative social outcomes (Gregg et al., 2008). However, in most cases people engage in only slight-moderate self-enhancement. Rather than damaging interpersonal relations, the self-serving bias has been shown to improve them due to positive attributions towards the people, institutions, and environments with which an individual is associated (Taylor & Sherman, 2008).

The self-enhancing bias is also adaptive through its positive contributions to optimism through the selective processing of information that aligns with positive self-perceptions and future expectations (Bosson et al., 2003). Taylor’s (1984) study of women with breast cancer revealed that those exhibiting self-enhancing beliefs remained more optimistic and coped better than those who did not. The finding that optimism generated from self-enhancing beliefs acts as a psychological buffer against traumatic events has been demonstrated across various demographics and different types of traumas (Updegraff & Taylor, 2000; Updegraff et al., 2002). The adaptivity of optimism is clear in studies demonstrating its strong associations with improved psychological functioning, a finding not limited to industrialised nations (Gallagher et al., 2013).

Self-protection bias, the second component of the self-serving bias, is adaptive due to through its prevention of the ‘vertical’ escalation of negative self-perceptions (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). In the ‘hierarchical network of interests’ model which outlines five levels of self-esteem (global self-esteem at the top and event-specific esteem at the bottom), the self-protection bias stops negative self-perceptions arising from negative events from escalating beyond event-specific esteem relations. For example, if an individual performs badly on a test and, subsequently forms a negative self-perception, the self-protection bias prevents this negativity from causing more general feelings of incompetence that could affect global self-esteem. By inhibiting these vertical connections and confining negative self-perceptions to the specific event (such as a singular test), potential harm to global self-esteem is prevented. 

The fundamental attribution error (FAE) is the tendency to overemphasise personal disposition and underemphasise situational factors when evaluating others’ behaviour (Jones & Harris, 1967). The first argument supporting the adaptivity of this bias lies in its cognitive efficiency. According to the ‘cognitive miser’ theory, people tend to conserve cognitive resources by relying on mental shortcuts (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). With regards to the FAE, making quick, judgements about a person’s disposition allows for a preliminary understanding of behaviour without the need to expend cognitive effort considering the myriad of complex, interplaying external factors. This approach offers evolutionary advantages, including cognitive resource conservation, more efficient decision making, and greater adaptability to complex, uncertain environments. The role of cognitive economy in the use of the FAE is evidenced by the increased likelihood of committing this bias when under high cognitive load, when one has less motivation or energy to process situational information (Gilbert, 1989).

Quickly forming judgements about others’ dispositions also allows us to condense complex situationally specific behaviours into simplified concepts. These dispositional inferences are adaptive, satisfying one’s need for control by alleviating anxieties about the unpredictability of others’ behaviour. This perception of control is not only desirable but has been argued to be a psychological necessity (Leotti et al., 2010). Even when inferences are incorrect and this sense of control is illusory, it still has positive psychological effects (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).

The FAE also provides a sense of control by alleviating anxieties about unpredictable external factors. Attributing others’ behaviour to their disposition and downplaying the role of external factors helps maintain a sense of control, reassuring that similar external factors may not impact us in the same way. This aligns with Lerner’s (1977) ‘just-world’ hypothesis, the notion that people find ease and comfort in the belief that people generally get what they deserve. Considering the inverse, if situational factors can exert unjust pressures on somebody else, then one must face the uncomfortable truth that the same could happen to them. Minimising the role of situational factors in determinations of accidents has been shown to protect against the belief that the same misfortune could happen to oneself (Shaver, 1970). The benefits of maintaining a strong ‘just-world’ belief are multiple, demonstrating significant correlations with lower stress levels (Lucas et al., 2013), improved resilience (Riaz, 2015) higher self-esteem (Dalbert, 1999), and improved global well-being (Bochaver et al., 2019). Thus, the adaptivity of the FAE also lies in its contribution to ‘just-world’ beliefs.

However, the FAE is not wholly adaptive. Fundamentally, it is a cognitive bias that relies on limited information to make firm, potentially erroneous judgements. If our post-hoc reasoning is based on false intuition, it may lead to unfair assessments and characterisations of others. A number of studies have observed how attribution errors contribute to both racial stereotypes (Hart & Morry; 1996; Lukyste et al., 2013) and gender stereotypes (Peturson et al., 2011). Thus, committing the FAE may perpetuate stereotypes through dispositional inferences based on limited information. While stereotyping, as its effects manifest externally and not directly on the individual doing the stereotyping, may not be considered maladaptive, its contribution to prejudice and discrimination reflects the broader negative consequences of this attributional bias.

Furthermore, the FAE may impact interpersonal relationships by indicating a lack of understanding of others. Studies have shown significant correlations between attributional complexity and higher levels of perspective taking and empathic concern (Joireman, 2004). The benefits of demonstrating empathy are well-documented, showing significant associations with greater emotional satisfaction in relationships (Davis, 1987), effective conflict resolution (Coyle, 2018), and more positive affect in general (Devlin et al., 2014). Thus, the potential maladaptive nature of the FAE lies in its relationship with empathy, and the potential negative consequences on interpersonal relationships resulting from a lack of empathic concern when attributing others’ behaviour.

To conclude, both the self-serving bias and the FAE can be considered adaptive. The self-serving bias contributes to both self-esteem and optimism, two features that confer significant benefits to psychological well-being. Similarly, the FAE shows adaptivity through its cognitive efficiency and capacity to dissipate anxieties surrounding the unpredictability of other people and situational factors. In both cases, biases exhibited to the extreme will have maladaptive consequences. Over-use of the self-serving bias may result in antisocial tendencies and damaged interpersonal relations, while excessive use of the FAE may result in uninformed judgements that perpetuate stereotypes and harm interpersonal relationships. To label either as either adaptive or maladaptive is inherently reductive, considering the influence of context and individual differences. With slight-moderate engagement, both of these biases appear more adaptive than not, but at their extremes there is the potential for maladaptive outcomes.

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